The course covers the basics of non-cooperative game theory and information economics. The goal is to equip students with an in-depth understanding of the main concepts and tools of game theory in order to enable them to successfully pursue research in applied areas of economics and related disciplines, and to provide a solid background for students who are planning to concentrate on economic theory. The course starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations as a game. It proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements (dominance and iterative dominance, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium), strategic interaction under incomplete information (Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium), and asymmetric information (adverse selection, signaling, screening, moral hazard, and the principal agent problem). The discussion of all theoretical concepts will be accompanied by representative applications from economics. The course is mostly self-contained, but students should be familiar with basic concepts from calculus, linear algebra, and probability theory.