

# Procedural Effects and Party Pressure in European Parliament Roll Call Votes

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March 2, 2010

## **Abstract**

The literature on voting in the European Parliament (EP) highlights the role of legislative parties. This is often done by showing that the uncovered ideal point estimates cluster more heavily around party groups than extant measures of ideology. The standard approach is to study all roll call votes within a legislative term, effectively treating each vote as equally important. Yet, we know that most roll call votes are non-consequential in terms of their effect on EU policies, as they are taken on non-legislative resolutions. This raises two concerns. First, failure to account for vote specific party inducements may make the estimated ideal points appear more clustered around parties than what would be the case if such inducements were accounted for. Second, most of the roll call votes in the EP are on resolutions, to the extent that voting behaviour in non-legislative resolutions is unrepresentative for voting behaviour on codecision legislation, the estimated ideal points will generate a distorted picture of voting behaviour on the votes most researchers care about.

Building on the framework of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), this paper (1) estimates to what extent MEPs change their position when voting on codecision legislation compared to resolutions, and (2) evaluates to what extent party groups are able to influence the voting behaviour of the MEPs on specific votes. The results show that some MEPs behave differently on codecision and resolution votes. Furthermore, there occur substantive vote-specific party inducements on codecision legislation. As the standard approach ignores such effects, it risks painting a distorted picture of politics in the European Parliament.

Research on the European Parliament has evolved immensely since the mid 1990s. One of the main drivers of this development has been the systematic collection and study of roll call votes (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). Based on the analysis of all roll call votes since the first direct elections in 1979, Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) apply Nominat (Poole, 2005) to demonstrate that voting is predominantly by ideology rather than nationality. Furthermore, the MEPs are more tightly clustered together by party group in their voting pattern than in extant measures of preferences (Hix, 2002). The standard approach in this literature is to scale all roll call votes using the Nominat algorithm and regress the uncovered ideal scores on a set of independent variables (see also Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002b; Kreppel and Hix, 2003).

Recently, some scholars have raised a few concerns. First, Carrubba, Gabel, Murrain, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach (2006) argue that roll call votes are not representative of all votes in the European Parliament. Researchers should hence take account for this selection bias when using roll call votes to investigate voting behaviour on all votes (Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008). Furthermore, the vast majority of roll call votes are taken on non-legislative resolutions. These votes have no direct policy consequences. In contrast, only a small minority of the roll call votes are on codecision, the legislative procedure where the European Parliament is a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez, 2001). The revealed pattern from the analysis of all roll call votes may hence be dominated by the voting behaviour on resolution votes. To the extent that voting patterns differ across procedures, procedure-specific patterns may also go unnoticed. This is particularly problematic as it is the procedures where the EP is most powerful that are poorly represented in the roll calls.

Second, although virtually all of the literature on voting in the European Parliament investigates and comments on the ability of party groups to influence the voting behaviour of their members, Nominat assumes no party influence on individual voting behaviour. It is however somewhat problematic to use models that assume no role of parties to argue the role of parties (Clinton, 2007).

In order to address some of these shortcomings, I build on the framework of Clinton et al. (2004) to (1) allow MEPs to change their position across procedures and (2) ac-

count for vote-specific party inducement. The reader should note that I neither present a framework for explaining the MEPs ideal-points, as this have been done by Gabel, Hix and Malecki (2008) nor propose a selection-model to enable valid inferences from roll call votes to all votes (see Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2009).

For simplicity of exposition, I limit myself investigate party inducement and procedural effects in the one-dimensional setting. In a multi-dimensional setting, these extensions may cause several identification issues (Clinton and Jackman, 2009; Jackman, 2001; Rivers, 2003). Furthermore, existing research has shown that the first dimension explains more the 87 per cent of all voting decisions in the EP. Adding a second dimension only increase the number of correctly predicted voting decisions by 2 per cent (Hix et al., 2007, 167).

The next section demonstrates the role of procedural effects and party inducements in the EP literature. The second section links the Clinton et al. (2004) framework with these two extensions to the EP voting literature. The third section presents the data and the details of the estimation. The fourth section discusses the results. The key insight is that the standard approach to the study of voting in the European Parliament risk painting a distorted picture, as the approach is incapable of taking procedural effects and vote-specific party inducements into account. Rather than simply scaling the roll call votes and using the obtained ideal points as a variable in second-stage analysis, researchers should estimate statistical models of voting that incorporate procedural and party leadership effects.

## **Procedural Effects and Party Inducements in the EP**

Theories of legislative parties highlight the role of party leadership to discipline the members and to set the legislative agenda (Aldrich, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005). The ability of the European Parliament to set their own agenda varies across procedures. Hix et al. (2007, 113 – 115), going from no agenda-setting abilities on consultation and assent votes, via some on codecision amendments to full agenda-setting abilities on resolutions. In their chapter on agenda-setting and cohesion Hix et al. (2007, 105 – 131) investigate the determinants of voting cohesion, they find that the three main party groups

(EPP, PES and ELDR) are less cohesive on codecision than on resolution votes. All parties except the liberal and the Gaullist are more cohesive when their party requests the roll call. They also find that PES is more cohesive on amendments where the rapporteur is from their party. Rapporteurs have no significant effect for the cohesiveness of the other parties. These findings suggest that on votes where the the EP has full agenda-setting abilities, parties are able to control the agenda so that votes that split the main parties occur less frequently than on votes where the EP has less agenda-setting power. Furthermore, as party cohesiveness increases for parties that request roll calls, parties seems to be able to use vote specific inducement to ensure that their MEPs cast their votes the “right” way. This suggest that parties play a major role in determining the MEPs voting behaviour.

It should however be noted that behaviour in roll call votes may differ from behaviour in non-recorded votes. Carrubba et al. (2006) question the reliability of traditional studies of roll call voting in legislatures where the majority of votes are not by roll call (see also Carey, 2009). Their study of the first year of the 1999-2004 European Parliament reveals that roll call votes were neither called on a random sample of votes, nor requested proportionally by party groups. Most roll call votes are taken on resolutions. Roll call votes on codecision and assent legislation were in the minority (Thiem, 2006).

This leads to several observations. There is a need for a theory of roll call selection in order to understand the relationship between roll call voting and non-roll call voting. As such a theory is proposed in Carrubba et al. (2008, 2009), this will not be pursued further here. Instead, the aim here is to understand behaviour on roll call votes, ignoring the important issue of selection bias in roll call as a measure of all voting behaviour in the EP. First, the current practise of estimating ideal point in the EP, using either all votes from a certain period (eg Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002a; Hix et al., 2006, 2007) or a random sample of votes (eg Han, 2007) risk highlighting the pattern of voting behaviour on “unimportant” resolutions rather than “important” codecision votes. As Hix et al. (2007, 105 – 131) show that parties are more cohesive on resolution than on for example codecision votes, the aggregated results from these studies may over-report the clustering around party groups if such clustering mainly occurs on resolutions.. Consumers of Nominate scores may fail

to appreciate that this picture may not be representative for the voting behaviour in the legislative procedures, where agenda control is weaker as the implicit assumption in the literature is that ideal points do not differ by procedure.

$H_1$  : MEPs ideal points are identical across procedures.

Second, if party leaders are able to use vote specific inducements in order to convince their rank-and-file members to alter their voting behaviour, such inducements should be included in the estimation of the ideal point as failure to account for such effects may cause parties to appear more cohesive than they really are (Clinton et al., 2004, 363 – 366). Furthermore, the standard approach focuses mainly on the ideal-points of the legislators. However, theories of legislative politics also provide hypotheses about the the vote parameters, for example the distribution of cut-points (the midpoints between the yes and no alternatives) as well as the characteristics of the votes where party leaders choose to supply inducements to their rank-and-file members on order to ensure that they take the “correct” voting decision. The implicit assumption in the the standard model is no such party inducements.

$H_2$  : Vote-specific party inducements do not occur.

The remaining of the paper will tests these two hypotheses. The next section will describe how the standard spatial model of voting can be extended to test these two implicit assumptions. As the technical details have been presented elsewhere (Clinton et al., 2004; Clinton and Jackman, 2009; Jackman, 2000) this presentation focuses on the intuitive interpretation of the parameters in model.

## **Estimating Procedural Effects and Party Inducements**

This section demonstrates how procedural effect and party inducements can be incorporated in the spatial model of voting framework. The main advantage of incorporating these measures in the framework of the model is that these effects can be tested directly, rather than resorting to the standard two-stage approach with its associated statistical and theoretical problems. The main statistical problem is the failure to properly account

for uncertainty in the estimates. The main theoretical problem is that the model used to generate the ideal points assumes no party effects, yet these estimates are subsequently used to test for party effects (Clinton, 2007).

The spatial model of politics arranges both actors and policies geometrically in a low-dimensional Euclidean space. Actor  $i$  has quadratic loss function around her ideal policy location  $\theta_i$ . Her utility of policy  $m$  is  $U_i(p) = -(\theta_i - m)^2$ . This is obviously minimised when  $\theta_i = m$ . In other words, an actor receives the highest possible utility if a policy is located exactly at her ideal point. She loses utility as the policy moves away from her ideal point. Conversely, she gains utility as a policy moves towards her ideal point (Hinich and Munger, 1997). The statistical implementation of this model is presented in Clinton et al. (2004). It can be written as a hierarchical probit model  $P(y_{ij} = 1) = \Phi(\beta_j' \theta_i - \alpha_j)$ , where  $\beta_j$  is the ability of vote  $j$  to discriminate between the legislators  $\theta$  and  $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  indicate the location of the indifference-point between the “yes” and “no” alternatives on vote  $j$ .  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the standard normal function.  $\theta_i$  is legislator  $i$ 's ideal point. Consider two legislators, L and R with ideal points,  $\theta_L$  and  $\theta_R$ . The larger the difference between  $\theta_L$  and  $\theta_R$  the less frequently do they vote together. Vote  $j$  with  $\beta_j$  different from zero is able to separate legislators on the estimated dimension. The larger the difference from zero, the better is the vote at distinguishing between legislators. The direction of  $\beta_j$  indicates who were most likely to support the proposal. If  $\beta_j$  is positive, it means that legislators with a high value on  $\theta$  were more likely to support the proposal than legislators with a low value on  $\theta$ . The opposite is the case if  $\beta_j$  is negative.

The cut-point on vote  $j$  is,  $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  is equally far from that “Yea” and “Nay” alternatives. This point can be of substantive interest as it separates those that prefer the “Yea” alternative from those who prefer the “Nay” alternative. Proposals with low  $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  separate between legislators with low  $\theta$ , while proposals with high  $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  separate between legislators with high  $\theta$ . The magnitude of  $\beta$  indicates to what extent the vote separates the legislators. Hence, if proposal  $z$  has a strictly positive  $\beta$ , with  $\frac{\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  equal to one, it means that legislators located above one are likely to support the proposal while legislators located below one are likely to vote against.

Han (2007) estimates a Bayesian version of this model on a sample of EP votes,

highlighting how different levels of participation in roll call votes cause different precision in the estimated ideal points. Nevertheless, the Bayesian implementation yields for all practical purpose similar estimates to the standard one-dimensional Nominate model, although it is easier to generate valid uncertainty around the estimates in the Bayesian procedures (Carroll, Lo, Lewis, Poole and Rosenthal, 2009; Clinton and Jackman, 2009).

Furthermore, in the standard framework, there is no straight-forward way to investigate whether legislators adopt different positions across procedures. For simplicity, consider two procedures. The obvious approach, to estimate one model for each procedure may give some indication, but there is no guarantee that the procedure-specific models are estimated on the same policy space. The standard solution to this problem is to restrict the some legislators to have identical positions in each of the procedure-specific models and investigate whether the other representatives change their position relative to the legislators whose positions are fixed. Of course, the legislators whose positions are fixed may actually change their positions just as much as those that are free to vary. All measures of change are hence relative to whose legislators whose positions are assumed to be fixed. This approach is similar to the approach taken to estimate the effect of switching parties (Nokken and Poole, 2004). I take a different approach. Instead of constraining some legislators to have identical position in the different procedures, I add a procedure-specific term  $\gamma_i$  to the model, which is legislator specific and capture the different in the ideal point of legislator  $i$  on votes in the two procedure. For votes in the first procedure, I estimate the standard model  $y_{ij} = -a_j + \beta_j\theta_i$ . For votes under the second procedure, I add the procedure specific term  $y_{ij} = -a_j + \beta_j(\theta_i + \gamma_i)$ . Note that  $\theta_i$  connects these two equations. The test of procedural specific ideal points amounts to testing whether  $\gamma_i = 0 \forall i$ .

If parties are important, they should be able to make their rank-and-file member alter their voting behaviour on specific votes. In the spatial framework, Clinton et al. (2004) label this a two-cut-point “party influence” model. A vote-specific party inducement adds a non-zero term  $\delta_{kj}$  to the indifferent point  $\alpha_j$ , with the aim of moving legislators from party  $k$  from one side of the indifference point to the other. It is only possible to estimate difference in the level of party inducements across votes. It is necessary to identify a set of

votes where there is no, or little party pressure. In the US setting, the standard approach has been to compare lop-sided with non-lop-sided votes (see for example Snyder and Groseclose, 2000). As there is no need to put pressure on inconsequential votes, another option is to assume that the inconsequential votes are free of party inducements, while parties may offer vote-specific inducements on consequential votes. For the inconsequential votes, I estimate the standard model  $y_{ij} = -a_j + \beta_j\theta_i$ . For the consequential votes, I select a party to be the reference category, and add  $k-1$  vote-specific  $\delta_{jk}$  term where  $k$  is the number of parties  $y_{ij} = -a_j + \beta_j\theta_i + \delta_{jk}$ . The test for absence of vote-specific party inducements amounts to testing whether  $\delta_{jk} = 0$  for all votes across all parties.

It would of course be possible to let each legislator take up a different position across the procedures and allow for party-specific vote-specific inducements. This could be done by replacing  $\beta_j\theta_i$  with  $\beta_j(\theta_i + \gamma_i)$  in the previous equation. The equation  $y_{ij} = -a_j + \beta_j(\theta_i + \gamma_i) + \delta_{jk}$  allows us to estimate the extent of vote specific party inducements and change in ideal points across procedures. It is straight-forward to extend this model in various other directions, for example by modelling agenda effects (Clinton and Meriowitz, 2001; Clinton and Meiowitz, 2003) the evolution of ideal-points over time (Martin and Quinn, 2002), or characteristics of constituencies and parties (Clinton and Jackman, 2009). This section has simply demonstrated the flexibility of this framework for addressing pressing questions in the literature on voting in the European Parliament, the next section presents the data used to address these questions and provides details regarding the estimation of these models.

## Data and Estimation

In order to address whether it is defensible to ignore procedural effects and party inducements on consequential votes, I selected all  $2^{nd}$  reading codecision amendments ( $n = 403$ ) and a sample of resolution votes ( $n = 450$ ) from the Hix, Noury and Roland roll call dataset from the  $5^{th}$  European Parliament (Hix et al., 2006, 2007). I dropped all votes with fewer than 25 MEPs on the losing side, and all MEPs participating in fewer than 100 of the votes. This left me with 359 resolution votes and 354  $2^{nd}$  reading codecision amendments for 659 MEPs.

I estimate two different models.

The first model is the procedural effects model. Here we allow MEPs to take a different position on 2<sup>nd</sup> codecision amendments. In the second model, we do not allow MEPs to take different positions in the two procedures. Instead, we investigate the extent of vote specific party inducements on 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision amendments. In the third model, we allow for both different ideal point in the two procedures and vote specific party inducements on codecision amendments.

The models are programmed in JAGS (Plummer, 2009), the standard approach for estimation of Bayesian models with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) (for an introduction to Bayesian models in JAGS/WinBUGS, see Gelman, Carlin, S. and Rubin, 2004; Gelman and Hill, 2007; Gill, 2008; Jackman, 2009; Ntzoufras, 2009). As with all Bayesian models, it is necessary to specify the prior beliefs about the parameters to be estimated. As a measure of precaution, I opted for conservative priors centred around zero. If the data contains little information, such priors draw the parameter estimates towards zero. The priors are as follows:  $\alpha_j \sim N(0, 1)$ ,  $\beta_i \sim N(0, 1)$ ,  $\delta \sim N(0, 2)$ ,  $\gamma_i \sim N(0, 1)$  and  $\theta_i \sim N(0, 1)$ .

I ran 30 000 iterations and discarded the first 5000 iterations for both models. Due to the large number of parameters in the model, I kept the results of every 5<sup>th</sup> iteration. The models were initiated with all MEPs from the far left party group (GUE/NGL) at -1 and all British members of the Christian Democratic / Conservative party group (EPP-ED) at +1. The other MEPs are initiated at 0. This initiation ensures that the direction is identical across all models. Note that these MEPs are only initiated at these values. No MEP is constrained to take any particular value. Standard convergence tests indicate no sign of non-convergence in any of the models.

## Results

This section first analyses the effect of ignoring differences across procedures, then the effect of vote-specific party inducements. Finally, the two effects are combined.

## Procedural Effects

The standard approach of pooling across all procedures implicitly assumes that there is no procedural difference. By allowing MEPs to take up different positions on resolution and 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision amendments this assumption is tested. Table 1 summarizes the test of no procedural differences. The results question the assumption of no procedural differences. For .455 of all MEPs, the 95 per cent credibility interval of  $\gamma$ , the parameter that captures the difference in the ideal point across the two procedures, does not overlap zero. Almost half of the MEPs adopt positions that differ by procedure.

The average effect masks substantive differences across procedures. In the EPP, .39 of the MEPs adopt a different position in 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision votes compared to the resolutions. Within the EPP there are large differences between MEPs from the major national delegations. For example, while .742 of the Spanish delegates change their positions, only .135 of the British delegates to the EPP change their position. Of the German delegates to the EPP, .339, while .44 for the French delegates and .472 of the Italian delegates to the EPP change adopt a different position on '2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision votes compared to the position adopted on resolution votes.

In the PES, it is mainly MEPs from the smaller delegations that change the position. Although .217 of the MEPs in PES alter position across procedures, only .086 of the German delegates, .08 of the Spanish and .034 of the British delegates alter their position between the procedures. No MEP from neither the French nor the Italian delegations to the PES alter their position between the procedures.

MEPs from the smaller party groups seem more affected the procedures. On the right, .391 of the MEPs from UEN change position. On the left, most MEPs change position. In the EUL/NGL .88 change. In V/ALE .755 change. In the centre of the policy-space, .689 of MEPs from V/ALE change position.

In total, there is substantive evidence against the assumption of no procedural differences in the ideal-point adopted by MEPs.

Figure 1 shows the substantive effect of the change in the ideal points across the two procedures. The figure sorts the MEPs by the ideal point on resolution vote and plots these on the left hand of the figure. On the right hand of the figure positions adoption on

	$\gamma \neq 0$	total
All MEPs	.435	659
EPP	.39	246
EPP (UK)	.135	37
EPP (Germany)	.339	53
EPP (Italy)	.472	36
EPP (France)	.44	25
EPP (Spain)	.742	31
PES	.217	184
PES (UK)	.034	29
PES (Germany)	.086	35
PES (Italy)	.00	16
PES (France)	.00	20
PES (Spain)	.08	25
ELDR	.689	61
V/ALE	.755	49
EUL/NGL	.88	50
UEN	.391	23

Table 1: Test of procedural effects,  $\gamma \neq 0$ .

2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision are plotted, sorted by position on the resolution votes. The figure shows that there is substantive more noise in the estimates of MEPs ideal points on codecision votes. More importantly, it is clear that there are larger differences between the party groups on codecision votes than on resolutions. We also see that the MEPs from the EPP move toward the right on codecision votes while MEPs from the PES seem to move towards the left. The mean position of the EPP is 1.93 on resolutions and 2.46 on codecision. The mean position of PES is -.96 on resolutions and -1.24. The differences between the PES and the party groups to their left, V/ALE and EUL/NGL is also larger on codecision than on resolution votes, 1.83 vs 2.46, and 1.91 vs 3.29. This subsection has demonstrated that many MEPs adopt a different position on resolution votes than on codecision votes. Furthermore, there are bigger differences between party groups on codecision votes than on resolutions. The increased differences between the party groups may be due to vote-specific inducements from the party leaderships on the codecision votes. This possibility is investigated in the next subsection.




Figure 1: Estimated ideal point, left = resolutions, right = codecision amendments

## Party Inducements

Party-leadership may use “carrot and sticks” in order to ensure that rank-and-file members vote toe the party line. There is more at stake for parties on codecision legislation than on resolutions. Thus , party-leadership should offer vote-specific inducements on selected codecision votes, not on resolutions. This subsection investigates the use how parties use vote-specific inducements on 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision votes and whether such inducements make the parties appear more united when such inducements go unaccounted for.

	$\delta \neq 0$	+	-
EPP	.404	.282	.121
UEN	.452	.18	.271
ELDR	.678	.35	.347
PES	.689	.35	.339
V/ALE	.297	.212	.085

Table 2: Test of party inducements,  $\delta \neq 0$ , and the direction of the inducements.

Table 2 offers an overview of the proportion of 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision votes with vote-specific party inducements. It also presents direction of the inducements of the party groups. The table shows that there is substantive party inducements on these votes. For example, on .689 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision votes, PES offered inducements. These inducements were evenly distributed between positive and negative inducements. ELDR offered inducements on .678 of these votes, evenly distributed between positive and negative inducements. UEN supplied party inducements on .452 of the votes. On two out of three votes, these inducements lowered the party-specific cut-point. The EPP supply party inducements on .404 of the votes. Most of the inducements supplied by the EPP were positive, increasing the party-specific cut-point on the these votes. V/ALE supplied inducements on fewer than .3 of the votes. Most of these inducements were positive.

It is however hard to get a clear overview of the effect of vote-specific party inducements on the cut-points of the votes. It is hence instructive to plot these effects for the three main party groups, PES (upper), ELDR (middle) and EPP (lower). Figure 2 plots the party-specific cut-points for the votes with party-inducements. The key insight is that these three parties obtain different effects through their use of votes-specific party inducements. PES use inducements to move a large proportion of the votes to the right, ensuring that




Figure 2: Estimated vote-specific party inducements for PES, ELDR and EPP. the imposed histogram indicates the distribution of the MEPs ideal points from relevant party group. Left hand shows the actual cutpoint. Right hand shows the party induced cutpoint on the votes were party inducements occurred.

even those furthest to the right inside their party groups ends on the same side of the cut-point on these votes. There is also a large proportion of votes where the party-induced cut-points are just to the left of the mean of the party group. On these votes, the purpose of the party-inducement is to ensure that their leftist MEPs do not defect to the left. ELDR seems to be able to use party inducements to move the cut-points well to the left or to the right of the ideal-points of their members. EPP is clearly less able to use party inducements to move the cut point away from the centre of their party. This is partly due to the heterogeneity of preferences within the party. On many of the votes where EPP supply inducements, the British conservatives still end up on the other side of the cutting line.




Figure 3: Estimated ideal point, with vote specific party inducements

This finding is substantiated in figure 3 which presents the estimates from the model that accounts for vote-specific party inducements. The key insight is that failure to

account for vote-specific party inducements make the British delegation to the EPP appear closer to the rest of EPP than what is the case when such inducements are taken into account.

## Procedural Effects and Party Inducements

The two previous subsections have shown that there may be both differences in the position adopted by MEPs across procedures and vote-specific party inducements. This section models both these effects jointly. First, for the three main party groups, vote-specific inducements occur on more than 80 per cent of the 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision amendments and over one third of all MEPs adopt a different position on codecision amendments compared resolutions. Interesting, when party inducements are accounted for, all but two of the British members of the EPP adopt a different position on 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision legislation compared to resolutions, while hardly anyone from the other major national delegations to the EPP, the German, Italian, Spanish or French, adopt different positions across the procedure. About half of all MEPs from PES take different positions on codecision amendments compared to resolutions. In particular, all of the French and half of the British delegates to the PES adopt different positions.

Figure 4 shows the resulting ideal-points when both party inducements and procedural differences are accounted for. The key insight is that there are even larger differences between the British delegates to the EPP and the rest of the party group. Furthermore, on codecision amendments, many members for the PES are indistinguishable from MEPs from the Green and leftist GUL/NGL group. More than half of the MEPs from the GUL/NGL group and the liberal ELDR group adopt a different position on resolutions compared to 2<sup>nd</sup> reading codecision amendments.

Finally, figure 5 shows the effect of vote specific party inducements on the party-specific put-point once the procedural differences are accounted for. We see that all the three main parties offer vote-specific party inducements on a votes where the cut-point is, close to, or in the interior of the codecision-specific distribution of the ideal points of their MEPs. However, PES also supply inducements on votes with cutpoints further to the right. Both PES and ELDR are mostly able to supply party inducements so that the




Figure 4: Estimated ideal point, left = resolutions, right = codecision amendments

party specific cut-points are to the exterior of the distribution of codecision specific ideal points, but ELDR seem to be more successful than PES. While EPP are able to move the party-specific cut-point on some of the votes, on a large majority, the party-specific cut-point are interior to the distribution of the ideal points of their MEPs. A large share of these cut-points fall between the British delegation and the rest of the EPP.

## Summary

Although research on roll call voting in the European Parliament has substantively increased our understanding of EU politics, the standard approach of pooling all roll call votes across all procedures has met some criticism lately, particular with regards to representativeness and selection bias (Carrubba et al., 2006, 2008). In this paper, I investigated procedural effects and vote-specific party inducements. Such effects cannot properly be accounted for in the standard approach to the study of roll call voting in the European Parliament. Building on the Clinton et al. (2004) framework, I demonstrated that almost half of the MEPs change their ideal point by procedure. Furthermore, there are substantive vote-specific inducements on important votes. While most of the findings in this paper collaborates with much of the existing research, the approach allows for interpreting procedural and party effects within the coherent framework of the spatial model of voting.




Figure 5: Estimated vote-specific party inducements for PES, ELDR and EPP. the imposed histogram indicates the distribution of the MEPs codecision-specific ideal points from relevant party group. Left hand shows the actual cutpoint. Right hand shows the party induced cutpoint on the votes were party inducements occurred.

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