

The Central European Jewish Intelligentsia and the European Nation State, 1791-1994¹

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Abstract

My lecture explores the paradoxical relationship between the Central European Jewish intelligentsia, the European nation state and the Austrian Empire. The Jewish intelligentsia, a modern phenomenon, reflected Jewish acculturation into German culture and responded to the prospect of the integration of the Jews as equal citizens into the nation. The political idea of the nation, emerging from the French Revolution, made Jewish emancipation possible, but its consummation, whether in cultural assimilation or in ethnic exclusion, would have spelled the end of the Jewish intelligentsia. For a century and-a-half, the Central European Jewish intelligentsia existed precariously between assimilation and exclusion, its survival dependent on the nation state's inability to drive the logic of nationalization to its end. But in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Jews found a balance between premodern imperial federalism and modern nationhood that opened opportunities for Jewish culture missing elsewhere. The Monarchy dissolved in the aftermath of WWI, and, in the 1930s, ethnonationalism triumphed throughout Central Europe, triggering a collapse of the European order and the triumph of Nazi racial imperialism. The Central European Jewish intelligentsia came to an end but, in exile, Jewish émigrés fashioned cosmopolitan visions of the "Multinational Habsburg Empire," presaging postnational Europe. A remnant of the intelligentsia returning to Europe in the postwar years helped internationalize European culture before leaving the scene, much celebrated, in the aftermath of 1968. Contemporary Europe has made the old Jewish intelligentsia an icon of Europeanness, and has finally integrated the Jews.

Thank you all for coming today. I would like to thank the IMT, and especially Professor Stefano Gattei, for inviting me. It is a distinguished pleasure and honor.

I am an intellectual historian best known, perhaps, for his work on philosopher Karl Popper. (slide) This work has led me to a broader consideration of the German acculturated Central European Jewish intelligentsia from the Enlightenment to the Cold War. This intelligentsia requires no introduction – the names of Marx, Freud, Schoenberg, and Adorno are famous enough. I am interested, however, not only in intellectuals – philosophers, poets, journalists, and rabbis – directly engaged in the

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production and circulation of ideas but also in the audience of the educated consumers, often members of the liberal professions, like Karl Popper's father, Simon, a refined lawyer and sometimes a poet and satirist. Comparisons across culture and time may mislead, but in speaking of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia, I think of an audience similar to the readers of the *New York Times Book Review*, or the cultural sections of such European papers as FAZ and *Corriere della Sera*.

Popper was born to a Protestant family and rejected a Jewish identity. Many, perhaps most, of my protagonists sought to distance themselves from Jewish culture. You might ask why I call them Jewish. Well, identities are not merely "subjective," a matter of personal self-identification; they also have collective historical dimensions. "Once labels [such as 'Jew'] are applied to people, they have social and psychological effects." The progressive nationalization and ethnicization of Central European politics, specifically, the rise of racial antisemitism, circumscribed the life possibilities of people, like Popper, Adorno, Freud and Marx, who were identified as Jews, and they responded in diverse ways, but all marked by their Jewish situation. Popper was a proponent of Jewish assimilation into non-Jewish society. Endeavoring to understand the Jewish dilemmas that led Popper to advocate assimilation, I began thinking how the problems of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia reflect those of the European nation state, and how the fortunes of Jewish emancipation convey the nation state's dilemmas. The result is my forthcoming book (slide), and my lecture will be based on parts of the introduction.

As you can see from the contents, the book has three central axes: the contrast between the European nation state and the Austrian Empire, the Central European Jewish intelligentsia, and the typology of Jacob and Esau. I use the case of Jewish emancipation

to illustrate the dilemmas of the European nation state, the opportunities offered by the Austrian Empire, and the reconfiguration of this empire as a multinational ideal in the imagination of Jewish European émigrés. I also use the changing narratives of the conflict of the two biblical brothers, Jacob and Esau, to illustrate the dilemmas of Jewish integration, the limits of emancipation and the difficulties the nation state had in resolving the Jewish Question. Those difficulties, I argue, are essential to the European nation state rather than coincidental. They sustained a Jewish intelligentsia, which, in response to the predicament of national integration, formed cosmopolitan visions, often in the image of the Austrian Empire, visions that have been iconized by contemporary Europe.

Several chapters on the Central European intelligentsia and its cosmopolitan visions have been published as essays (slide) and I will not be discussing them. Nor will I be mentioning today Jacob and Esau. (slide) Rather I wish to give you an overview of the dilemmas of the European nation state as they are seen from the perspective of Jewish history, then move on to discussing the Central European Jewish intelligentsia as an international network in the nationalist age. I hope to provide an example of how we can write Jewish history as European history, and how the Central European Jewish intelligentsia may be used to internationalize the writing of European history, that is, to transcend the perspective of national history and write a transnational history. This is a major challenge European historians confront in the postnational age. (slide)

I shall focus today the paradoxical relationship between the Central European Jewish intelligentsia and the European nation state and try to configure the place of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire in this relationship. The Jewish intelligentsia, a modern phenomenon, reflected Jewish acculturation into German culture and responded to the prospect of the integration of the Jews as equal citizens into the nation – Jewish emancipation. (slide) The political idea of the nation, emerging from the French Revolution, made Jewish emancipation possible, but its consummation, whether in cultural assimilation or in ethnic exclusion, would have spelled the end of the Jewish intelligentsia. For a century and-a-half, the Central European Jewish intelligentsia existed precariously between assimilation and exclusion, its survival dependent on nationalism's inability to drive the logic of nationalization to its end. When it did, triumphant ethnonationalism undermined the nation state it purportedly sought to secure, and, racial imperialism (masquerading as "homeland nationalism") brought the entire European order down crushing, together with the Jewish intelligentsia.

Jewish integration in Europe always remained elusive. The nation state could neither effectively assimilate the Jews nor easily accommodate a Jewish culture. The religious and cultural diversity of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires seemed to offer Jews greater prospect of ethnic and cultural accommodation. (slide) But, in Russia, nationalization proceeded without the Western corollary of constitutionalism and civic equality – the nation's emancipatory agents for Jews. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, an unusual constitutional order, representing a convergence of national and imperial, modern and premodern forms, sought to manage culturally and religiously diverse people as they were going through nationalization and ethnicization. This imperial order afforded Jews modes of integration absent elsewhere, even recognition as a nationality. Still, a majority of the Jewish intelligentsia in Austria remained wedded to

integration via German nationhood, culturally defined. They recognized that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resembled “the international order of mankind in miniature” but they saw no contradiction between the empire and a culturally defined German nationalism. German culture was cosmopolitan, they thought, the empire a vehicle for its spread. The promise of emancipation having first emerged from the nation, the liberal Jewish intelligentsia found it difficult to part with German nationalism to sustain what appeared to many as an antiquated empire, defying the paradigmatic road to “modernization” – the nation state.

Managing emergent ethnicities and nationalities, vying with each other for imperial hegemony or protecting themselves against it, presented formidable challenges to the empire. World War I ended with the empire’s disintegration, terminated the multinational prospect, and assured that its potential success will remain forever controversial among historians, and alive in the Jewish intelligentsia’s imagination. (slide) The fall of other empires – German, Ottoman, and Russian –made the nation state the European norm. Germany and Austria guaranteed all their citizens full rights, and other states sharing in the Habsburg territorial legacy signed treaties protecting minority group rights. Unprecedentedly, the League of Nations undertook to protect these rights under international law, and a search for transnational European collaboration – cultural and political – began. Emancipation completed? Hardly. Within a decade, the international regulation of majority – minority relations in the new nationalizing states collapsed, and interwar Central Europe became an ethnic battleground, multiethnic nation states – “ethnic democracies” – trying to become ethnonational, minorities seeking to

undermine the state and join compatriots across the national borders, the Jews the great losers all over, victims to mounting antisemitism.

Recognizing the lost opportunity of imperial multiculturalism, many Jewish intellectuals of (imperial) Austrian origin – from Karl Popper to Joseph Roth to Franz Werfel and Stefan Zweig – began envisioning in the 1930s cosmopolitan commonwealths in the image of the vanished Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Historians Oscar Jászi and Robert Kann dubbed the Monarchy, a bit anachronistically a “multinational empire.” Post-World-War II remigrés, like Hilde Spiel and Friedrich Torberg, followed suit by envisioning a Central European Culture whose major protagonists were Austrian Jewish writers. (slide) The predicament of Jewish national integration created Jewish cosmopolitanism. Contemporary Europe has recovered the émigrés’ and remigrés’ idealized vision of Central European culture under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a culture unbound by national borders and open to membership based on cultural affinity. Utopian and nostalgic, a product of spiritual exile, Jewish cosmopolitanism inadvertently imagined a postnational Europe.

The story of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia, which began with the Jewish enlightenment, the *Haskalah*, and late Enlightenment proposals for Jewish integration, is nowadays over. The Jewish intelligentsia went into exile, or up in flames, a Jewish nation state emerged, and Jewish life in the U.S. – a multicultural nation state and an empire – appeared as a viable alternative to the European nation state. Still, a remnant of the old Jewish intelligentsia, the remigrés who returned to Europe, contributed immensely to the liberalization and internationalization of European culture in the postwar years. But 1968 – the rift between many émigrés and the 68ers – made it clear

that the old intelligentsia had no successors. Having educated the generation that arose for and against it, the old intelligentsia retired, greatly celebrated, in favor of a younger intelligentsia, seeking to build a new Europe. (slide)

The new Europe was building up new forms of international organization – economic, political and cultural. Of necessity, diversity became a precondition of Europeanness, even an ideal. To be sure, the presupposition of ethnocultural uniformity that underlay even enlightened republican nationalism remains operant in Europe on both the national and European levels, and it reveals itself nowadays when the integration of Moslem communities is at issue and in debates on European identity. But the conditions for Jewish integration have altered: Jews qua Jews have nowadays become “European.” Contemporary Europe has made the old Jewish intelligentsia into an icon of a newly emergent postnational culture. The eternal outsiders, the Jewish intelligentsia, have become the embodiment of Europe’s future, a comic-ironic end to a tragic history. Today’s European Jewish intelligentsia represents a new beginning – or at least one hopes so.

In drawing the European nation state and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as polar models, I am blind neither to the frequent coalescence of nation and empire in continental Europe (and beyond) nor to empires advancing national (or racial) hegemonies. But, in pre-WWI Central Europe, empire implied federative institutions countervailing the pressures for nationalization, i.e., for cultural and political homogenization. (slide) Imperial institutions drew consciously on the Holy Roman Empire’s premodern corporative traditions, and, in Austro-Hungary’s final decades, they faced major challenges managing competing ethnic and national claims. They allowed for

efflorescent cultural diversity, increasingly uncommon in the European nation state, and permitted a broader range of choices for Jewish life. The “multinational Habsburg Empire” may be a term coined by interwar and postwar émigré historians, many of Jewish origin, and their view of the empire as “multinational” and doomed by nationalism may have been tinged with anachronism and determinism. But they grasped well the opportunities lost with Austro-Hungary’s dismemberment into nation states, opportunities that, in the postnational age, we call “multicultural.” Emancipation vested the Jews in the nation state and they appeared to embody modernity. This lecture suggests that we reconsider whether prenatal and supranational imperial orders may not offer opportunities for Jewish life missing in the nation state. From the Austrian perspective, the Jews look less modern than we have imagined them.

Now that I have given you an overview of my argument, let me survey the opportunities open to the Jews in modern Europe from the French Revolution to the Holocaust, discuss the diversity of strategies they pursued in negotiating relations with other Europeans and in seeking integration, and their diverse understanding of what it meant to be a Jew in European culture – until just about the time when you most of you were born. Remember that, in terms of Jewish history, we live in a different Europe today. (slide)

The Jews and the European Nation State – Jewish strategies and identities

The French Revolution pronounced the idea of equal citizenship, which entailed also the indivisibility of the nation. “The principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation.... No body, no individual can exert authority which does not emanate expressly from it.” This meant an end to autonomous corporations, such as the *Kehilah*,

the traditional Jewish community that represented the Jews to the state and collected taxes. The *Kehilah* could not fulfill functions deemed political by the modern nation state. The Jews could become citizens as individuals but not as a collective. “To the Jews as individuals everything, to the Jews as a nation, nothing!” (slide) declared Clermont-Tonnere in 1791 in the French National Assembly, when expressing support for granting citizenship to French Jews.

Clermont-Tonnere’s logic was compelling. The nation state had little choice but to extend citizenship to the Jews. Given the imperative of national unity, the only alternative was declaring the Jews foreigners, subject to expulsion. There were voices suggesting just that, more among German than French nationalists, but for the first eighty years after the revolution, the formation of the European nation states, from France to Italy and Germany, coincided with Jewish emancipation. Nationalization appeared a liberating force for the Jews. (slide)

Nationalization entailed a drive toward a unified culture, shared by all citizens. In what sense could Jews remain Jewish? The state was tolerant of different religions, but the idea that Jews constituted only a religious community failed to gain acceptance. From the first proposals for improving Jewish conditions in the late Enlightenment, opponents of Jewish integration insisted that, unlike Catholics and Protestants, the Jews were a different people. Jewish difference was essential, not the creation of historical conditions, and this difference was increasingly defined as racial. Most crucially, Jews did not belong in the nation because they constituted, said Johann Gottlieb Fichte in 1793, a “state within a state.”ⁱ Their purportedly religious community was political. The nation state could not tolerate a competing source of sovereignty.

What options did the Jews have for defining their place in the nation state? In France, where the state headed through the schools successful nationalization, melting regional identities and dialects into a political culture, the majority of Jews went through rapid French acculturation and political and economic integration. They conceived of Jewish difference as religious and sought no recognition of a Jewish culture. Religious solidarity motivated philanthropic activities for Jews around the world – the *Alliance Française*, encouraging Jews throughout the Mediterranean to adopt the French path of acculturation, its foremost example – but they remained, they said, French patriots to the bone. But even in France, religion served as an “ethnic” marker – and not for the antisemites alone. The 1871 Crémieux Law extended French citizenship to the Algerian Jews, recognizing them as European, siblings of their French compatriots and, amazingly, the European settlers. Modern overseas empire could occasionally prove as beneficial to Jews as premodern continental one. In both cases, however, nation and nationalization were the emancipatory agents, empire the guarantor of pluralism.

French Jewish integration survived major antisemitic challenges. The Dreyfus Affair of the late 1890s confronted the civic with “integral nationalism,” the latter a convergence of premodern royalist and church ideals with modern ethnicity. In the aftermath of the Affair, an assimilated Jewish elite remolded republican state ideology, endeavoring to form a national consensus around the ideals of 1789. The 1930s saw, as elsewhere, a resurgence of integral nationalism, and the Vichy Regime, their culmination, showed how fragile even successful Jewish integration in the nation state was. Still, even the Holocaust triggered initially only limited changes in the French Jewish community’s orientation. The dissipating power of the republican melting pot in the postwar years and

the immigration of the more traditional North African Jews have changed in recent decades the community's character. All the same, France remains the classical case of civic nationalism. It suggests that, for the sake of citizenship, or national integration, Jews willingly paid the price of thinning down traditional Jewish culture.

Napoleon's troops brought civic nationalism to Germany where it confronted German ideas of nationality. (slide) Germany being politically fragmented, German conceptions put the premium on culture rather than on politics. They reflected the legacy of German humanism and the *Aufklärung*, the German enlightenment, but they gave expression also to racially inflected populism, binding ethnicity and culture in the pursuit of nationhood. The protracted process of German unification made nationalization an open, and contentious, process and, until the 1870s, more an intelligentsia than a state project.

Jews sought integration into Germany as both a political nation and a *Kulturnation*. In the aftermath of the *Hasklah*, the Jewish enlightenment, *Bildung*, educational and cultural formation, became the key concept in German acculturation. Cultural Germanity, or *Deutschtum*, also seemed an essential complement to citizenship in Central Europe. Germany's political boundaries were not set until 1871, so belonging in the German cultural sphere seemed as significant as citizenship, at least for the intelligentsia. But, in France and Germany alike, Jews made claims for their culture's universal character. German Jews offered Goethe, Lessing, Kant, Schiller, and Shakespeare (!) as icons of a national culture that fulfilled the *Aufklärung's* humanist ideals. Loyalty to the nation and to humanity was one – national cosmopolitanism.

German Central Europe was the site for the most intensive emancipation debates. Against the ethnic concept of the nation propagated by emancipation's opponents, jurist Gabriel Riesser (1806-1863), leader in the fight for Jewish equality, argued in 1831 that the blood that counted most was that shed by both Jews and Germans on the battlefield during the wars of liberation against Napoleon. It created one nation, regardless of origin.ⁱⁱ All the same, as late as the mid-1840s, Ludwig Philippson (1811-1889), leader of Reform Judaism, still used the concept of a "Jewish nation". But remaining a national minority vitiated the prospects of integration, and emancipation's opponents made it doubtful the nation state would tolerate such a minority. The Jewish intelligentsia was searching for a collective identity between religion and nation. Vienna's chief rabbi, 1865-1893, Dr. Adolf Jellinek, suggested that the Jews were a tribe (*Stamm*). The German nation, noted many, was multiethnic in origins; the Jews could be one of its tribes. The suggestion was as ingenuous as it was far-fetched: It required a constructionist vision of the nation, the last thing on ethnically minded nationalists would entertain. The Jewish *Stamm* testified to the discursive murkiness of emancipation debates and to the difficulty in setting parameters to Jewish identity in the nation state.

(slide) The great majority of European Jews inhabited the Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire, where emancipation remained a distant dream, and the spread of the *Haskalah* formed an intelligentsia with a different range of political options than in Central and Western Europe. The Russian Jewish intelligentsia confronted for much of the nineteenth-century a largely traditional Jewry, upholding a religious view of the Jews as a separate people, neither desirous nor capable of integration. To traditional East European Jews, observance of Jewish law (*halakhah*), religious tradition, common

ancestry, and language (Yiddish), united the Diaspora. They emphasized the Jews' loyalty to the state but were hostile to nationalism and nationhood. Wherever the threat of national integration or conflict emerged, traditional Jewish leaders responded with, what I propose to call, "illiberal multiculturalism," a set of arrangements for the peaceful coexistence of closed ethnoreligious communities. Contemporary multiculturalism represents a postnational effort to pluralize the nation state. Jewish traditionalism was multicultural because it was instinctively prenational, preferring empires to nation states.

Vaguely racial motifs had long been part of German (and most other) concepts of nationality, and they coexisted with political and cultural conceptions of the nation. The 1880s saw a shift from civic to ethnic nationalism, the accentuation of ethnic dimensions of nationality and their reification into racism. Reinforced by pseudoscientific discourse, race became the salient dimension of nationhood, foundation of the political and cultural nation. German antisemite Wilhelm Marr coined the term antisemitism in 1879. A blatant attempt to reverse emancipation, modern antisemitism was the epitome of ethnonationalism. In hindsight, the nation state was set on a course that would end, in the 1930s, with the exclusion of the Jews from civic life in much of Central and East-Central Europe, and worse.

(slide) The rise of ethnonationalism and racial anti-Semitism in the 1880s left the Austrian Jews excluded from German nationhood, but the Empire opened for them an opportunity missing in Germany – supranational imperial patriotism. The ambiguity of Austrian-German nationhood, the existence of a pluralistic imperial order, and the intelligentsia's diverse integration strategies in German, Hungarian, Czech, and Polish speaking regions meant that Austrian Jewish intellectuals lived in-between cultures in a

manner unknown in nation states. Loyalty to the empire extended widely from traditional Jews to the Zionists to the assimilated intelligentsia. Well into the final days of World War I, when the Empire already lay in ruins, Viennese Jewish papers insisted that, federally reorganized, a multinational Empire was viable.ⁱⁱⁱ

(slide) As long as Jewish integration seemed vital in Western and Central Europe, and an even remote prospect in the East, Jewish nationalism remained subdued. From the 1880s on, the variety of emergent Zionism and Diaspora nationalism signaled the predicament of emancipation. Until the Holocaust and the foundation of Israel, Zionism and the pursuit of Jewish nationhood represented a minority among European Jews, but the balance began tipping already in the 1930s, as the Central and Eastern European nationalizing states progressively shut off the Jews from political and economic life. Zionism's success was a function of the European nation state's failure to integrate the Jews.

Emancipation's predicament triggered among the Jewish intelligentsia also opposite responses to Jewish nationalism – socialist internationalism and liberal cosmopolitanism. Most internationalists regarded Jewish difference as a regrettable historical contingency and assumed that the Jewish Question would find its solution in an international order superseding the nation state. Jewish intellectuals were heavily represented among the leadership of the Marxist socialist parties that took part in the Second International, and, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, of the Third International, the Comintern, dominated by the Soviet Union. The Comintern had a liberal counterpart in the international networks of Central European intellectuals.

Whether liberal or socialist, cosmopolitanism was the refuge of a Jewish intelligentsia rebuffed by the majority nationalities.

I shall say more about Jewish cosmopolitanism when discussing the international networks of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia. But, for now, these seem to have been the optional strategies, broadly outlined, for Jewish integration in the European nation state. Whether the Jews opted for integration or multicultural co-existence, nationalism or cosmopolitanism, their experience points beyond the nation state, to the ideas and practice of internationalism and, hence, the potential, and indeed the necessity, of writing Jewish history as European history. I would next like to map the Jewish strategies of integration, and Jewish dilemmas, against the ideas and practice of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia and its international networks. It should come as no surprise that my account will privilege the Austrian intelligentsia: imperial pluralism – political and cultural alike – gave Austrian Jewish intellectuals a broader range of options than, say, the German or French. Outlining the possibilities of empire and nation for the Jews against each other may produce a new European narrative.

The Central European Jewish Intelligentsia

(slide) Acculturation into non-Jewish culture created the modern Jewish intelligentsia. To be sure, there was hardly a period of Jewish history when Jews did not engage with non-Jewish politics and culture. Even where ghettos existed, they by no means meant closure or isolation, nor did the *Kehilah*. But the modern Jewish intelligentsia addressed national politics and culture from the standpoint of citizenship, and not of a Jewish minority, and as part of the emancipation project. It cannot be thought apart from Enlightenment, *Haskalah* and emancipation. Even Jews adverse to

acculturation did not escape its influence. Pre-enlightenment Jewish rabbis may, perhaps, not count as a European intelligentsia but modern rabbis very much do, as they, too, were responding to the prospects of acculturation and citizenship.

More controversial may be my use of assimilated Jews to speak of Jewish cosmopolitanism. “I am of Jewish descent, but ... I abhor any form of racialism or nationalism; and I never belonged to the Jewish faith,” said Popper in response to the Jewish Chronicle’s request to include him. “Thus I do not see on what grounds I could possibly consider myself a Jew.”^{iv} His profession of identity must be consulted, but it cannot be accepted. “Collective identities,” *pace* Popper, “are products of histories; and our engagement with them invokes capacities that are not under our control.”^v He grew up in an assimilated Jewish family and, from childhood to death, his closest friends were assimilated Jews. Preponderantly Jewish networks, Viennese and Central European, were essential to his intellectual growth. He partook in a unique cosmopolitan discourse that addressed the problems of assimilated Jews. Antisemitism drove him to exile; emigration saved his life. He retained a special relationship to Jewish nationalism, condemning it, yet feeling responsible for it. “Assimilated Jew” is an ascribed identity, not a self-identification, but it captures well the social and psychological effects that shaped Popper’s life chances and imagination. Speaking of the ‘assimilated Jewish intelligentsia,’ I simply recognize that collective historical identities, beyond their subjects’ (or the historian’s) control, both invoked and set limits to Jewish cosmopolitanism.

Until World War II, the hegemonic international culture of Central and East-Central Europe remained German. German acculturated Jewish intellectuals provided a

major constituency for the legendary multinational networks of the fin-de-siècle and interwar years. The networks' non-Jewish members commonly came from groups that did not easily find their place in the mainstream national cultures. They could be progressive Austrians and Germans who broke with antisemitism, socialists and communists organized in the International(s), or monarchists, aristocrats and clerics failing to adjust to the nation state after the Habsburg monarchy's dissolution. International culture emerged as a response to ethnonationalism, a by-product, reflecting the limits of nationalization. Had a neat national division of Europe been possible, or nationalization, the international intelligentsia would have disappeared. The networks would also not exist in a world that did not know ethnonationalism since their international identity was formed in opposition to national exclusivity. Cosmopolitanism and nationalism belonged, as opposites, in the same political moment and discursive universe.

Liberal Jews committed to German national integration stood always at the center of the Central European networks. With the rise of German ethnonationalism, they endeavored to retain universal enlightenment visions and cultural definitions of being German. But some of the best evidence for the internationalization of Central European culture in the age of ethnonationalism is the international networks offering alternatives to Jewish integration. The Zionist network extended from Austria proper to Bohemia, Galicia and Bukovina to Hungary and across the border into Russia. Rivaling the Zionists in its geographic range was the Marxist socialist network, fragmented though it became by national divisions. Even traditional and Orthodox Jews could not buck the trend. In 1912, Orthodox German and Polish Jewry established Agudath Israel, a world

alliance of Torah loyal Jews. On the eve of World War I, these networks were competing for Jewish support among themselves and with liberal Jews upholding the ideal of national integration.

Central European Jewish cosmopolitanism developed different patterns in Germany and Austria. Until 1848, both German and Austrian Jewish intellectuals regarded the fortunes of Jewish emancipation as tied with those of German liberal nationalism. The Czech and Hungarian national uprisings in 1848 made it clear that the Austrian Empire faced a different national problem from most German states. If the Empire wished to remain unified, it would have to accommodate multinationalism. Austria's expulsion from the German Confederation in the aftermath of the Prussian victory in Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866, as well as the *Ausgleich* in 1867, completed the transformation of the Austrian Jewish intelligentsia. Austrian Jewish intellectuals, German acculturated but originating in the Empire's diverse national regions, now had to redefine their relationship to Austro-German nationalism

Imperial pluralism, undergoing ethnicization and nationalization, made life problematic but also opened opportunities for self-definition not available in Germany. When German nationalism turned antisemitic in the 1870s and 1880s, German Jewish intellectuals remained wedded to national cosmopolitanism – integration through *Bildung* into a national culture considered cosmopolitan on account of its humanism. Austrian Jewish intellectuals toyed with broader options, including loyalty to the imperial transnational ideal, even against the German nationalists. The ambiguity of the Austrian-German nation, the existence of a pluralist imperial order, and the intelligentsia's

multiregional origins made Austrian Jewish political ideals more diverse than German Jewish ones.

In Germany, liberal nationalists were anxious about their own nationality problem – the Poles and the Jews. Max Weber understood well the constructed character of nationhood, but he launched his career with a call on the state to close the eastern borders to Polish rural laborers and undertake aggressive economic policy to assure the German character of the eastern provinces.^{vi} No German Jewish intellectual rose to defend the Poles. When Rosa Luxemburg attacked German nationalism, she did so in the name of socialist internationalism, not multinationalism. The liberal historian, Theodor Mommsen, an indefatigable fighter against antisemitism, set the limits of national tolerance. He ridiculed myths of an Aryan Germany: German nationality, he told antisemites, was an ethnic amalgamation, and he was looking forward to the Jewish contribution. But, for nationhood's sake, ethnocultural fusion must occur, and its product must be one national culture.^{vii} This was fin-de-siècle German liberalism at its most accommodating, and it had no space for a Jewish culture. Most liberal Jews refused Mommsen's call for religious conversion but concurred with him about nationhood. Liberal Germans and Jews alike regarded Germany as an embodiment of cosmopolitan humanism.

(slide) Much greater pluralism existed across the Austrian border. German-speaking Hungarian Jews went after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 through quick Magyarization and behaved as if they were members of a nation state in an imperial union with Austria. The Jewish intelligentsia was part of the Hungarian elite, the government repressing quickly popular antisemitism. German-speaking Bohemian Jews increasingly moved in

the 1890s to Czech as their daily language, but failed to gain acceptance into Czech nationality.^{viii} Kafka despaired at the “linguistic impossibilities” of the Prague Jewish writers, who had left Jewish tradition behind but got caught in a no man’s land between the warring German and Czech nationalists.^{ix} In Galicia, Polonization made headway among the Jewish intelligentsia, but they faced, after 1863, increasing hostility from Polish nationalism, now defining itself along ethnic lines. Bukovina, (point on slide, then next slide) where all Central European cultures seem to have met, was a center of Jewish Diaspora nationalism. (Czernowitz slide; explain) Diverse as their politics were, the Jewish intelligentsia shared in German acculturation and had to come to terms with a pluralistic Empire, going through rapid, but divergent formation of nationalities and the ethnicization of politics. They lived in-between cultures in a manner unknown to German Jewish intellectuals.

(slide) The rise of antisemitism and ethnonationalism in the 1880s left the Jews unable to gain admittance to whatever nationality (Hungarian excepted, perhaps) they were trying to join. But imperial pluralism opened for Austrian Jews an opportunity missing in Germany. Jews were the only ethnic group to adopt enthusiastically the official *Staatsgedanke*, the Austrian imperial idea – the ideology of dynastic patriotism. “The only unconditional Austrian,” said Joseph Bloch of the Jews.^x The liberal and progressive Jewish intelligentsia was slower to join the imperial cult than traditional Jews, and the socialists never did, but loyalty to the empire extended widely from traditional *kaisertreuen* Jews to the Zionists to the assimilated intelligentsia. Austrian imperial patriotism appeared multinational, making Jewish participation easier.

The dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire in the aftermath of World War I did not terminate the international networks across Central Europe. (slide) In Vienna's and Prague's the literary cafés one could pretend throughout the interwar period that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy never collapsed and multicultural Central Europe was well and alive. The international networks now defined themselves against multiple nationalizing states and cultures. Internationalism and ethnonationalism were now more intimately bound than ever, the pursuit of "homeland nationalism," the racial imperial endeavor to gather all members of nationality across borders in one state, only the ultimate, and perverted, expression of internationalism in the ethnonational age.

It was no coincidence that so many European networks, including the Pan-Europa movement, made the former imperial capital, Vienna, their center. Interwar Austria was the nation state no one wanted: The socialists and Pan-Germans opted for German unification, the first based on civic nationalism and the 1848 ideals, the second on ethnonationalism and imperialism, while the Catholics dreamt of an Austrian-led Danubian federation. Inheritors of a pluralistic imperial legacy, Austrian Germans and Jews were strangers in ethnonational Europe. Their searches for a new home across borders were uncharacteristic of other nationalities (which endeavored to expand their borders or gather the nation at the home state). They were, by default, and against their wish, cosmopolitans in an ethnonational age.

Cosmopolitanism proved no match to ethnonationalism or racial imperialism. The early 1930s witnessed to collapse of the League of Nation's protection of national minorities, nationalizing states undertaking to exclude the minorities from economic and political life to assure the hegemony of the core nation. Polish logician Alfred Tarski (ne

Teitelbaum), a member of the Vienna Circle network advancing scientific philosophy, reported from Warsaw in October 1936, that he no longer had any prospect of a professorial appointment, and soon, he feared, everything would be *gleichgeschaltet* (coordinated) after the German example.^{xi} Like many of his colleagues, Tarski would escape Europe in the nick of time. In the major exodus preceding World War II, and continuing through the War's early years, the Central European Jewish intelligentsia went into exile. Central Europe's loss was others' gain. The émigrés would transform academic culture and several disciplines in the US and Britain.

The divergent schemes for reorganizing Central Europe collided, and the Nazi racial empire emerged triumphant. Even the Nazis tried putting international face on their new Europe. Baldur von Schirach's European Youth League, convening in September 1942 in Vienna, built on interwar conservative European movements. Those conservative movements included Catholic Jews – Hugo von Hofmannsthal the most famous. Schirach's new Europe was to do without them. As Vienna's *Gauleiter*, he took pride in deporting the Jews, a contribution to European culture, he said in opening the convention. This spelled the end to the Central European Jewish intelligentsia.

The murder of the European Jews, the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe and parts of Central Europe, and the other population transfers of the immediate postwar years, nowadays labeled "ethnic cleansing," turned Europe into a conglomerate of ethnonational states as it had never before been in history. The Cold War divided Europe, making a Central European culture impossible. In communist East-Central Europe, cosmopolitanism became synonymous with treason. The economic infrastructure lay in ruin. Still, a remnant of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia

survived for another generation. The *rémigrés*, who either returned to Central Europe, or chose to settle in Western Europe, were best positioned to rebuild international cultural relations.^{xiii} Their multicultural network contributed to the formation of a new Western European and trans-Atlantic culture.

(slide) The Congress for Cultural Freedom, an international organization of anticommunist liberal and socialist intellectuals, coordinated one of the major postwar trans-Atlantic networks. Founded in a major international conference in June 1950 in Berlin, and supported clandestinely with CIA funds, the Congress relied heavily on the *émigré* networks and became a nerve center of cold war liberal culture, supporting an international seminar program and sophisticated politico-cultural magazines in several languages. Revelations of the CIA support and the changing global and European contexts of the mid-1960s brought about the congress' downfall in 1967. The fall coincided with the wave of student (and worker) rebellions sweeping much of Western Europe and the U.S. 1968 marked a major generational shift: the end of the old Jewish intelligentsia and the beginning of a new one.

(slide) The 68ers' outright rejection of Cold War culture and politics and their tense relationships with many *émigrés* reflected divergent generational experience. *Émigré* cosmopolitanism, born out of hyper-nationalist but also multiethnic interwar Europe, exile and totalitarianism, jarred with student internationalism, born out of a divided Central Europe, stable nation states and a search for revolutionary solidarity. Still, the 68ers had an indissoluble, if ambivalent relationship to the *émigrés*. (slide) Directly and indirectly, the *émigrés* were their teachers, and, in confrontation and collaboration alike, the 68ers focused attention on the *émigrés* and their cultural

achievement. The challenge the 68ers mounted to national narratives, albeit with a focus on fascism and not on the Holocaust, undermined normalization of the past, and made the émigrés symbol of its victims. Forging political solidarity, cultural affinities and sociability across national borders, the 68ers mimicked the émigré networks, forming transnational communities, relaxing national boundaries. Paradoxically, the 68ers helped catapult the émigrés to the center of European intellectual life, making them spokespersons for European culture.

To be sure, the 68ers were reinforcing long-term trends towards the internationalization of European culture, the confrontation with the past and the celebration of the émigrés. Transatlantic popular culture and an international consumer culture made major headways in Western Europe from the late 1950s on. The critical transformation in German historiography had already begun in the early 1960s and the Holocaust became central to it only in the 1980s. The 45ers, who had grown up under Hitler and received their academic education in the postwar years, often from the émigrés, advanced the émigré legacy as much, if not more than the 68ers. In the aftermath of German university reforms of the late 1960s, the 45ers became the new academic elite. All the same, 1968 catalyzed ongoing processes and became the great symbolic moment of change.

(slide) In 1970s Germany and Austria, the émigrés became celebrities, and the further Europe progressed toward a transnational union, the more central their legacy seems to have become to European culture. The new Europe defined itself against the Holocaust and made the Central European Jewish intelligentsia, for the first time in history, bona fide members. A younger Jewish intelligentsia rediscovered in the 1970s

and 1980s Jewish history and culture, even Zionism. As Europe purportedly made diversity a virtue, and Jewishness became a mark of Europeanness (or a welcomed hybrid of the European and the other), the new intelligentsia claimed acceptance as Jewish – and received it. (slide) The long sought integration of the Jewish intelligentsia, long refused by the nation state, has been (temporarily?) accomplished in a postnational European Union.

Conclusion: Jewish History as European History

The two centuries history of the European nation state show it living in an uneasy balance between ethnonationalism and multiculturalism. A supranational order – global or European – has sometimes been the only guarantor against deterioration into domestic warfare. The nation state survives only if neither ethnonationalism nor multiculturalism is pushed to its limits. The Central European Jewish intelligentsia was coexistent with the nation state, dependent on the balance – and tensions – between ethnic and civic citizenship, between multiculturalism and nationalization. Living the dream of national integration that could well spell its end, the Jewish intelligentsia was decimated when, on the contrary, nationhood became racially defined, and the Jews were excluded. As East-Central Europe was, to quote Karl Popper, “one of the most mixed of all the thoroughly mixed regions of Europe,” the exclusion of the Jews signaled the end of the nation state, as the nineteenth-century knew it, and the collapse of the European order.

But the nation state made a come back in the postwar years, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. The postwar European order was reconstructed on its basis, the ethnic cleansing – “population exchange” – of the immediate postwar years aimed to enhance its stability. European economic and political institutions have emerged as,

literally, inter-national collaboration. The European states first accepted a common Western European defense reliant on a transatlantic superpower, protesting all the while that their sovereignty remained unscathed yet occasionally rebelling (France), then grudgingly, and partially, conceded that the economic benefits of Europeanization, and the pressures of globalization, outweigh the constraints that a common policy may put on national autonomy. Early postwar visionaries of Europe, the great founders, often conservative and Catholic, had vivid memories of the collapse of empires in the aftermath of WWI, and felt impelled to reconstruct a Europe that will avoid the catastrophic failure of the interwar order. The support for the European Union came from generations shaped, liked none before, by nation states, generations who had known a continental empire only as an external threat.

The old Jewish intelligentsia's imperial cosmopolitan visions did *not* end up providing postnational Europe's framework. Europe has gone through considerable relaxation of national boundaries, and current willingness to recognize membership in communities across borders based on individual affinity may mimic the personal cultural autonomy Austrian socialist leader Otto Bauer envisioned for a reorganized Austro-Hungarian empire. But Bauer endeavored to resolve the impossibility of bounding nations territorially under the empire, whereas Europe presently relaxes national territorial boundaries created at insufferable human cost. The European Union is postnational, not imperial in character, at least for now.

Postnationalism has triggered several historiographical transformations. Historians have been increasingly declaring the nation state a historical exception and empire normative. Impressed by the diversity of imperial governance and insistent that

even autocratic ones, such as nineteenth-century Russia, afforded opportunities for participation, historians have sought to relativize citizenship against a spectrum of imperial rights regimes. Jewish history affords support to this move – but also points out its limits. The nation, not empire, has been the liberating agent for modern Jewry. In premodern continental empires undergoing nationalization, such as the Austrian and Ottoman empires, and in modern overseas empires with a metropolitan nation-state, such as the French empire, citizenship rights were extended to the Jews (1867 in Austro-Hungary, 1908 in Turkey and 1870 in French Algeria) as part of constructing nationhood. Empire served as a guardian of pluralism and a mediator among contending religious and ethnic groups but *not* as an emancipatory agent.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy proved so attractive to Jews because it represented a unique balance between premodern imperial pluralism and modern nationhood. Nationalization has progressed just enough to emancipate the Jews, yet imperial pluralism survived, creative federative arrangements conducive to Jewry's protection against nationalizing groups, hence commanding Jewish loyalty. Few progressives saw virtue in imperial pluralism itself. Even Bauer's "personal national autonomy" was a counsel of despair in face of unyielding pluralism turning nastily nationalist, not a joyous celebration of multiculturalism. He repeatedly bemoaned Austro-Hungary's failure to build up a democratic nationhood. The Empire's appeal was never greater than after it had already collapsed, and a Europe of ethnonationalizing states degenerated into warfare.

U.S. Austrian and Czech historians have recently emphasized the limits of nationalization in the late Austrian Empire. They highlight provincial indifference to

nationalism, resistance among groups that found their loyalties split across newly established ethnic divides and a general failure of the nation to become the center of people's life. Nationalism's putative success, they suggest, was due to the nationalist intelligentsia's press manipulation and to the post-WWI Settlement's adoption of national self-determination as a guiding principle for setting state boundaries in Central and East Central Europe, creating zealously (if not altogether successfully) nationalizing states. They endeavor to rethink European history away from the familiar narrative of nationalization of amorphous ethnic groups as inexorable modernization. They have disposed of the historiographical convention of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy living on borrowed time in an age of triumphant ethnonationalism, and regard the Austrian Empire as a viable alternative modernization to the one represented by the European nation state.

Furthermore, the postnational historians regard ethnic and national categories as devoid of explanatory power. They point out that we can not revert to prenational ethnicities to explain emergent nationalities – both formed together, ethnicity no less an invention than nationhood – and ethnonationalizing states played a crucial role in nationalization and made it deadly. They retain religion as a cultural marker, but they foreground political categories, especially constitutional arrangements, as crucial to identity formation. They deny that Austro-Hungary was multinational, inasmuch as nationalities were only created by interwar (or even postwar) nationalizing states (if then), and, at their most radical, they deny that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was an empire at all: Hungary behaved like a (liberal) nation state and Austrian federalism and constitutional pluralism were *sui generis*, non-imperial.

The Central European Jewish intelligentsia lends support to this postnational turn, but it also suggests its limits. The émigré *imaginaire* created the “multinational Habsburg Empire” but it was not divorced from the realities of imperial pluralism. The advent of nationalization and the ethnicization of politics in late Habsburg Austria constrained Jewish life but imperial pluralism opened new prospects. Both the exclusion from the nation, to which the Jews aspired to belong (German, Czech or Polish), and the new opportunities for Jewish culture – not to mention imperial protection – were real, deadly real, as it turned out. Like the postnational historians, the Jewish intelligentsia wished to foreground political and cultural definitions of nationhood against an ethnic one – to no avail. To be sure, the collaborative projects of Jews and German Austrians, as well as the preponderantly Jewish international networks, suggest that the definition of nationhood remained forever contested, but the evidence of increasing exclusion and hardening of ethnic lines is overwhelming. The nation may have become the center of life for only a few and provincials may have understood and cared little about the language wars raging in their regions, but at crucial historical moments most answered the nation’s call and fell behind newly forming ethnic lines, elections returns from contested territories consistently sustaining radical nationalism. Few, if any, modern inventions proved as successful as nationalism in drawing mass support.

The deconstructive edge of “ethnicity without groups” (Roger Brubaker’s term) is blunted when dealing with the European Jews, a diaspora long marked by religion, culture, and communal life, fulfilling (for all its lack of indigeneity) the prerequisites of ethnicity and nationality more than other groups. Through the Jewish intelligentsia, we can see non-Jewish ethnicity, forming as an exclusionary force, a barrier to Jewish

integration. Precisely ethnonationalism gave rise to Jewish cosmopolitanism and the Habsburg *imaginaire* – to postnationalism *avant la lettre*. If we deny nationalism's force, we risk missing the brunt of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, we ignore nationalism's emancipatory drive and miss on its paradox: The premise of equal citizenship represented modernity's promise to the Jews and made the Jewish intelligentsia possible.

The Jews exemplify a European, and even a global trend. The postwar French Empire's unsuccessful bid to reform and survive by extending citizenship to overseas subjects was grounded in democratic French nationhood. Imperial diversity – in governance, participation, rights and culture – ran immediately into conflict with national uniformity and metropolitan anxieties rendered the project futile. But its very existence suggests that egalitarian nationhood had become for postwar Europeans the only legitimate mode of governance. Jewish emancipation was among the first and most persistent European tests to the egalitarian force of nationalism and gave testimony to its Janus faced character.

Jewish emancipation shows the European nation state to be a paradox – a promise impossible to fulfill, except within a postnational order, yet a promise without which the modern Jewish Diaspora cannot do. The liberal intelligentsia preferred nation states to empire but, until the collapse of the Russian and Austrian empires in the aftermath of World War I, the majority of European Jews – traditional and Eastern European – preferred empires to nation states. The threat of domestic chaos, should the empire collapse, drove traditional Jews most. Whereas the liberal intelligentsia wagered on nationalism's promise of integration, the traditionalists dreaded populist antisemitism. But, in nation states in danger of falling apart, such as contemporary Belgium, Jews often

appear as the single representatives of the national culture. How is one to square Jews as “the best Austrians,” the only people enthusiastically adopting the Austrian imperial idea, with Jews as “the only remaining Belgians,” the single devotees of a nation state dissolving into its multicultural constituents? “Thou shall always be praying for the welfare of the monarchy,” says the *Mishna*, “for without the fear of the authorities, people would devour each other alive.”^{xiii}

Choosing the Central European Jewish intelligentsia to tell the European nation state’s history is obvious: contemporary Europeans recognize the centrality of the Jews to European history, define the new Europe against the Holocaust and idealize the vanished Jewish intelligentsia as the best European. (slide) I attempted to show today that the story of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia is also that of Jewish emancipation and its failure, and it illuminates the dilemmas of the European nation state. But telling the history of the European nation state via the Jews, and writing Jewish history as European history involves a risk: The loss of that which is peculiar and unique to Jewish history and culture. If we focus on Marx, Freud and Adorno, we get a rather one-sided view of Jewish history, the Jewish intelligentsia, and the “European.” Europeanization turns out to mean, yet again, Jewish acculturation. To resist it, the historian must give expression to a range of Jewish cultures, using also traditional Jewish sources not easily assimilable to the European mainstream. Orthodox Jewish rabbis (slide) and Jewish homilies and sermons must become part of European history no less than Freud and Marx Marx. Writing Jacob and Esau into the history of the Central European Jewish intelligentsia diminishes the risk of dissolving the Jewish subject into the European. But this is, of course, a story for another lecture, another day.

(slide) Placing the Jews at the center of European history and highlighting their cosmopolitanism runs the risk of the antisemitic trap of seeing the international Jews' hands everywhere. Yuri Slezkine's *The Jewish Century*, viewing the Jews as the epitome of successful modernity, made me, too, uncomfortable. My European nation state story, in contrast, highlights the limits of Jewish agency and modernity. Cosmopolitanism appears more a story of despair about national integration than celebration of success, and as much a premodern throwback as a modern future. The Jews do not invent freely but as they are pushed around, and the happy end – their invention recognized by all Europeans – cannot obscure the fact that most of the Jews vanished in the penultimate act. Writing many minorities into history requires they be endowed with agency; writing the Jews into European history is as much a story of limiting their agency. Historians uncomfortable with Europe resolve the dilemma by configuring the Jews as colonial subalterns. As such, they can be endowed with agency without the risk of success – they always resist from the margins. But my subjects, the European Jewish intelligentsia, would not let me do it. There was nothing they wanted more than to be European. I have written a history that honors their wishes and completes their integration, as Jews, into European history.

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ⁱ “Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische Revolution,” in *J.G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, edited by Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacob, Hans Gliwitzky (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1962-): 1: 292–293.

ⁱⁱ Gabriel Riesser, *Verteidigung der buergerlichen Glueckstellung der Juden gegen die Einwuerfe des Herrn Dr. H.E.G. Paulus [1831]*, in his *Gesammelte Schriften*, 4 vols., Leipzig 1867, vol. 2.

ⁱⁱⁱ Marsha Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); David Rechter, *The Jews of Vienna and the First World War* (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2001).

^{iv} Popper to Michael Wallach, 6 January 1969, Hoover Institute Archives, Popper papers (313, 10).

^v “Once labels [as ‘Jew’] are applied to people, ideas about people who fit the label come to have social and psychological effects.” Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity,” *Critical Inquiry*, 27 (Winter 2001): 326; *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.178, respectively.

^{vi} Max Weber, *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik. Akademische Antrittsrede*, Freiburg and Leipzig 1895.

^{vii} Theodor Mommsen, *Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum*, Berlin 1880.

^{viii} Hillel Kieval, *The Making of Czech Jewry*, New York 1988 [but see Michael Miller on Moravian Jews for a modification].

^{ix} Franz Kafka to Max Brod, June 1921, in: Franz Kafka, *Briefe 1902–1924*, edited by Max Brod, Frankfurt 1966, p. 337.

^x “Nichts gelernt und nichts vergessen,” *Oesterreichische Wochenschrift* (22 June 1917): 390: “In der Tat sind die Juden nicht etwa die treuesten Anhänger der Monarchie, sie sind die einzigen bedingungslosen Oesterreicher in diesem Staatsverband.”

^{xi} Tarski to Popper, 11 October 1936 and 5 December 1936, Popper Archives (354, 8).

^{xii} Marita Krauss, “Jewish Remigration: An Overview of an Emerging Discipline,” *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 49:1(2004): 107-120.

^{xiii} Mishnah *Avot*, III:2. This tractate recites sayings and dicta of Jewish sages.