

EU's Projection of Security
Peace Missions as a Tool either for Fusion or Fragmentation

by Gianni Bonvicini

Looking at the rapid growth of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) since the Blair-Chirac meeting of Saint-Malò in 1998 and in particular at the launch of several crisis management missions, starting at the beginning of 2003, one might ask, in the light of these experiences, whether and how this area of cooperation has progressively moved into forms of fusion or whether, due to its strictly inter-governmental character, it might turn into a tool of fragmentation between policies, forms of governance and institutions.

In other words: who is (or will be) the winner in the field of ESDP and, particularly, of crisis management operations?

- a) The Fusion theory as a process of progressive Europeanisation of national instruments and procedures.
- b) Or, on the contrary, the tendency toward a growing fragmentation of the whole ESDPs' political and institutional system.

We intend, therefore, to investigate on the experiences made in the field and on their consequences both in theoretical and institutional terms on ESDP, with the aim of testing our two assumptions and contribute to the debate about the Fusion theory.

A full test of the fusion theory, as applied to ESDP, has not yet been carried out, not even by W.Wessels, possibly due to the very recent developments in this cooperative area. But he came pretty close to ESDP with some considerations on the external policies (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP) of the European Union (EU), the predecessor of ESDP. For example, in one of his first essays in June 1997 he underlined that “the fusion within the EU is also seen in light of alternative international set-ups; the EU has to compete with other arenas or ways of handling transnational and global problems”, having NATO clearly in mind as a competitive, more efficient institution in the security field (1). A perspective which has radically changed in recent years either because of the difficulties encountered by NATO in redefining its post-Cold War mission, or in the light of the more consistent role of the EU in crisis areas. However, it remained unclear in 1997

whether “government-free competition on the ‘market’ could become another form of dealing with transnational problems outside one’s borders”. He continued by saying that “the role of the state, including its European extension, would thus been reduced”. Hence, from one side, a move of ESDP as a new security actor towards some forms of fusion, or, on the other side, a process still largely open to fragmentation and ad hoc coalitions of states outside the EU framework.

More recently (2005) and at the structural-polity level, W. Wessels recognised the progress made within the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in the field of CFSP/ESDP. He focused his attention on the new figure of High Representative/Vice President of the Commission/President of the Council (in short, at that time, “Union Minister of Foreign Affairs”) in particular. In his judgment the “double hat” position of the new minister, member at the same time of the Commission (elected by the European Parliament) and of the Council (appointed by the European Council) “represent an almost ideal and/or typical instance of the trends predicted by fusion theory: legitimacy and functions are merged, while the office-holder is supposed to integrate several instruments and various procedures in a kind of hybrid function” (2).

In the area of European security one moves therefore from the uncertainties and the absence of instruments and procedures of 1997, just prior to the insertion of Article 17 (the Petersberg Tasks) into the Treaty of Amsterdam, to a situation that in 2005 signalled a leap forward in the institutional design of the EU, with the proposal to fuse the functions of the “Minister of Foreign Affairs/ The High Representative”, the Community’s authority on external relations, with those of the CFSP, including those relative to the ESDP, making one person responsible for both.

Once again, is this a victory for Fusion theory? Is it really true, even in a classic case of national sovereignties’ *domaine reserve*, such as the ESDP has been, that a merging between inter-governmental and Community methods has been brought about through the forces of things and events?

In attempting to answer this question it is necessary to analyse how the ESDP has developed in concrete terms during the last decade, in the light of Fusion theory.

Based on the studies conducted by Wessels during recent years, it can be stated that Fusion theory is grounded in three fundamental characteristics:

- It develops thanks to a **dynamic process** which over the course of time may find points of temporary equilibrium, but which in actual fact is destined to continual modification and institutional adaptation according to the circumstances and course followed of both internal and international events;
- It is created through the **progressive extension of EU competencies** and areas of intervention, both in functional and in geographic terms. New competencies and new ranges of engagement beyond the EU borders are necessary elements to drive the fine tuning of Community and national decision-making processes, and to allow any consequent adaptation between the two;
- It results from the acknowledgement of the Member States **of their incapacity** to occupy themselves individually with a given problem, either particular or general, judging it to be therefore the responsibility of some or all of the EU members.

These basic characteristics of fusion theory are easily applied to the ESDP and, in particular, to one of its principal policies of recent years: crisis management operations, originally described as one of the areas covered by the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), to be confirmed in the Treaty of Nice (2000), elaborated later in greater detail in the European Strategy Security (ESS) paper by Javier Solana (2003) and, finally, recognised in the Lisbon Treaty (2007).

Dynamics

Few sectors of cooperation within the EU have experienced acceleration as rapid as that of the ESDP. In the few years since 1998, when Britain's and France's leaders decided in Saint-Malò to take the initiative to push their partners along the road to military cooperation, progress has been noteworthy.

There was a preparatory phase involving declarations, promises, and analysis of the capabilities and objectives (the Headline Goals) in the military and civil camps.

During the second phase (2002-3) the doctrinarian and strategic frameworks of the common threats to and responsibilities of the Europeans were defined.

Then, from 2003, concrete operations began, through the launch of civil and military missions, designed to prevent and manage conflict.

All this developed within the space of 5-7 years, and in a manner which was almost unexpected (3). Initially, the meeting at Saint-Malò might have been considered to be one of the many attempts which were made from the beginning of the nineties, after the end of the Cold War, to give life to a European defence project. This objective was included in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, and repeated at Amsterdam, but it was never able to take off due to various political obstacles. It remained just on paper.

It was again this time the force of events (the conflict in the Balkans, specifically in Bosnia at the beginning of the '90th) and external pressure on the EU (above all from the United States) which put the virtuous mechanism of cooperation into gear. But the final push came through the realisation of the limited military capacity of the Europeans, in this case wearing their NATO hat, to first prevent then to hinder the violence of the Serbian paramilitary forces in Kosovo (1998). Europe was judged, once again, as bearing the largest share of responsibility for the ethnic cleansing which occurred. The fear of risking another genocide similar to that seen in Bosnia was also a feeling shared by national public opinion in Europe, which were considering the Union as the proper actor to take a rescue initiative. But, then, the limited European military operational capacity, which was once more compensated for by the Americans and NATO with their bombardment of Serbia, underlined our limits.

This prompted the decision to begin a first analysis and definition phase, looking into the existing military capability of each individual EU Member State. It was aimed to define objectives which could be developed within the shortest possible time span. Out of this, the Headline Goals were developed (4):

- In the military camp there were moves immediately after the bilateral summit at Saint-Malò. Already, in December 1999 at the European Council meeting in Helsinki, the Governments of the EU had set themselves the objective of forming a common military capacity, consisting of a rapid intervention force of around 60,000 men, to support the aims of the Petersberg Tasks (Headline Goal 2003). Immediately after the adoption of the ESS (2003) the EU Member States decided to rethink their opinions in the light of the strategic and technological changes which had occurred in the meantime. In May 2004 the Ministers of

- The crisis missions in the civil matters were subject to first analysis in June 2000 at the meeting of the European Council at Fiera, Portugal. At the centre of attention was the formation of a corps of around 5,000 police officers who would be sent to States in crisis. Successively, the European Council in Brussels in June 2004 adopted the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 (CHG 2008), aimed at concretizing post-conflict reconstruction, and at defining military operations more clearly. At this point the Civilian Response Teams (CTRs) were initiated, about which we will speak later. Finally, in November 2007, the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) was adopted, with the objective of once more elevating the qualitative levels and the civilian capacity in crisis management.

The combination of these decisions, seemingly unconnected, has served to boost the capacities at the disposition of the EU Member States, to define the objectives of peace missions, and to study the procedures and mechanisms required to render them operative. The civil and military Headline Goals also constitute, together with the ESS from Solana, the conceptual-strategic base of the role of the EU as a global security actor, and help to define its identity.

It began, as we have seen, in the military field, with the first Headline Goals at Helsinki, and it was followed up in the civilian area at the European Council at Fiera, and is significant how in the end such decisions lead to a fusion of civil and military aspects. This act of coherence is due to the necessity of resolving problems of inter-pillar coordination, and to give substance to a concept of a European security based largely on a mix between the civil and the military (5).

There is no doubt, therefore, that one of the main elements which have characterized the area of crisis management has been the political and procedural dynamics. It has also given life, as we will

see further down, to a significant number of new decision mechanisms and procedures, changes which had not necessarily been foreseen by the relevant Treaties.

The dynamics were evidenced in extraordinary bottom up institutional developments, the like of which has rarely been observed in other European integration sectors. We have, in effect, added a large push from below, which found its impetus in experience acquired in the field, and in the obvious necessity for the three different pillars to combine their competencies and experience in order to achieve the desired results. We will return to this argument later.

Extension of the Competencies.

The extension of EU competencies and range of involvement of engagement is the second characteristic on which the fusion theory is based. There is no doubt that the birth of the ESDP as a completely new area of EU responsibilities has significantly extended the political and competency spectrum of the EU. From the first definition on paper of the Petersberg Tasks at the beginning of the nineties, till the first mission in the field at the beginning of 2003 (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina) the movement toward a definition of new tasks has been particularly clear.

It is not for nothing that the theme of all recent institutional debates and of the reforms of the institutions as foreseen by Nice (2000) and Lisbon (2007) has mainly been about the EU as a new world protagonist and the definition of its role as actor on the international security stage. This is the current grand challenge for the EU: its capacity to extend its traditional economic/commercial role to a more consistent foreign and security policy action. The EU High Representative Javier Solana is a supporter of this need to play a greater role, and in his ESS paper he proposes an all-points answer to the emerging profile of an EU which increases its range of responsibilities, including those in the area of security (6).

The ESS, in conjunction with the solidarity clause inserted in the Constitutional Treaty and later on in the Lisbon Treaty (art. 222), defines the themes and threats that need to be confronted as an Union. In particular, it mentions the trans-national challenges that individual members have difficulty in confronting alone: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, State failure, and organised crime. It is clear that these are new areas of cooperation in which the EU has never before acted concretely, but which, under the pressure of external events, it is now obliged to take into consideration.

The ESS imposes no geographic limits on European activities. Even if particular attention is given to the 'ring of friends', the bordering States, a direct EU responsibility in the rest of the world is not denied.

A subdivision into geographic areas of the EU 19 peace missions conducted to date (beginning of 2008) allows an appreciation of the global range of European interventions. The list includes: six missions in the Western Balkans, which remains one of the areas of special interest for the EU; six in Africa, where the European missions participate without support from NATO; three in the Middle East; one in East Europe at the border between Moldavia and the Ukraine; one in the Caucasus (Georgia); one in Central Asia (Afghanistan); and one in Asia (Aceh/Indonesia) (7).

We see, therefore, new responsibilities, new competencies in the areas of security and defence, and an extensive range of engagement in distant areas of the globe.

Inadequate Responses on the Part of Single Member States

Lastly, the third fundamental element of fusion theory derives from the ascertainment that particular problems cannot be adequately and effectively responded to at the national level and that therefore the responsibility must be transferred to the level of Union cooperation. The foreign security of the EU is regarded as a common responsibility for at least three main motives.

The first is that the type of challenge to be confronted is by nature trans-national and that the national borders are not sufficient as protection: the challenges must be confronted collectively and require the use of Union's competencies and instruments. The observation that a single State is not in condition alone to face a crisis external to its own borders is one of the principal reasons for a push towards forms of cooperation that are more effective in action. Of course, the transit towards closer modes of cooperation has not always been immediate. On certain occasions it may first be necessary to put the political limits and difficulties of the national role to test. The French approach to the crisis in the Congo is typical of this attitude. The first European mission, Artemis in 2003, was decided under the direct French pressure and leadership, even if the mission fell under the umbrella of the ESDP. But the national character of the operation was clear. The second military mission to the same country (Eufor, RD 2006) was instead from the beginning a completely European mission under UN mandate. France, in other words, understood that European political

backing must, apart from issuing declarations of support, take the form of a concrete Union's intervention. The latest mission has thus developed under German command, with General Headquarters in Potsdam (8). There are good explanations for this evolution towards authentically 'common' missions: in the first place, national public opinion tends to almost spontaneously consider crisis foreign to national borders to be a multilateral responsibility, and, in the case illustrated, of the entire EU. In addition, this type of mission normally takes place under UN mandate, and therefore requires the formation of a coalition of States to make it acceptable and understandable on the part of the third State, the object of the mission. But the truly new element experienced by the Europeans is that the responsibility for the mission is accepted not by a coalition of a group of States, but that it is accepted by the EU itself, which approves the launch of the mission via the procedure of a joint action, as provided in the Treaties.

The second motive is that other multilateral organs, the UN, NATO, and the OSCE among them, may not always be in a position to react on their own or in alternative to the EU: quite the opposite, we see more and more examples of a tendency on the part of other international organs to directly appeal to the EU to be either a substitute or to carry the co-responsibility in the management of certain crises. NATO, particularly, has ceased to be considered the only security instrument available to the Europeans. The example of the Balkans is typical, where the EU found that it needed to progressively take over from NATO, both because of the ascertainment of a more direct political responsibility on the part of the EU towards the region, and because the nature of the crisis, a combination of civil and military elements, rendered the EU the actor best suited to carry the mission forward (9).

The third motive concerns this last point; that the EU, much more than other multilateral institutions, has at hand the instruments best suited to confront the entire cycle of crisis management.

- Before the crisis, with civil policies and the diplomacy of conflict prevention
- During the crisis, with the possibility of military deployment, of diplomatic pressure, and of human intervention
- After the crisis, with long term development aid and peace-building policies.

For all three phases the EU has a variety of "civilian" instruments at its disposal: well tested aid and development policies, several models of agreements with Third Countries, a consistent common budget, well functioning decision making procedures and an image of reliable partner. With the recent addition of some military competences in the ESDP field, the EU tends to complete the range

of instruments needed to match the whole crisis management cycle. In fact, if we look to the three phases of the cycle, clearly it appears that a military dimension might be needed for each of them (recognised also in the HG 2010, as reported above): to separate the parts in conflict through the interposition of military forces; to stop violence and enforce peace in the second one; to assure security and stability with the presence of military corps in the post conflict phase. A full combination of civil and military instruments represents therefore the right answer to the kind of crisis management missions that the EU is destined to conduct in its new function of full fledged security actor.

The Consequences at the Institutional Level: a bottom up development.

The push towards a role in crisis management for the EU and the manner in which the ESDP has developed in meeting these new responsibilities has led to an enormous complexity in the procedures and mechanisms of decision making.

The bottom up institutional development which has characterized the birth and evolution of the ESDP and its missions as a crisis management actor has brought with it some interesting consequences;

- It has given life to a notable number of new instruments both in the civil as well as the military fields; as a matter of fact, within the institutional framework of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), officially created in 2000 with the Treaty of Nice, in 2001 it was decided to form two committees to take care of military aspects: the Military Committee (EUMC) with the assignment of military action management, and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to carry out consultative functions for the PSC. The two Committees make use of a Planning Cell (2001), which must work together with (not substitute) the National Commands, and plan any EU military engagement for which the intervention of NATO has not been requested. Also of note was the decision to create the Battle Groups, a concept developed in HG 2010, and whose duty is to be available within 5 days and to complete missions of at least 30 days with a maximum number of 1,500 men (10). Another decision relating to the military should also be remembered at this point; that of the Council in July 2004 to bring forward the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA had been already been foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty (CT).

The initiatives in the purely civil sector have also been numerous. To guide the operations in the field and to plan the activities we have above all the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which in its turn depends on the PSC. Based on the HG 2008, a concept of Civilian Response Team (CTR) has been adopted, in order to accelerate intervention in the sector of Civilian Crisis Management (CCM). The CTRs reached operational status in January 2007: their role is to provide EU with experts on border policing, administration of justice, management of public administration services, etc. under the command of the PSC and the High Representative. More recently, in June 2007, the European Council decided to establish the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). This is planned to serve as a civilian equivalent to the EU Military Staff and to provide assistance and support to CIVCOM in the planning and implementation of civilian ESDP operations. But perhaps, as far as the execution of the missions is concerned, the most interesting aspect in terms of lessons learnt in the field was the creation in 2005 of a Civil-Military Cell within the EUMS, with the responsibility of providing a better link between the civilian and military dimensions of a mission conducted in the same area (11). The CivMil Cell is in turn subdivided into a Strategic Planning Branch and Operations Centre Permanent Staff. Of course, both the Commission and the Secretariat of the Council are also equipped to plan and carry out the operations both in the civil and military sectors, thereby increasing again the number of people and offices assigned to the task. In general, therefore, it can be claimed that the commencement of the crisis management missions has brought about a considerable proliferation of organs and procedures, making it extremely difficult to understand the decision making system of ESDP and to use it properly.

- It has created problems of coordination and efficiency within the single pillars (intra-pillar). There is no doubt in fact that the new dimensions of EU foreign relations in the area of global security also create problems of consistency within their own areas of competence. In particular, as far as the civil aspects are concerned, there is a clear need for better coordination between the more effective of the Community's tools such as aid policy, trade, and humanitarian aid and development policy. These are extremely important in the reconstruction phase of post-conflict States. Their effect is seen in the medium- and long-term. In fact, these tools represent the third phase of the entire crisis management cycle. The well organised and well-knit use of these policies is therefore essential in consolidating on the ground any success of a crisis management mission. The same goes for the other two pillars, the CFSP/ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs. Especially in the second pillar the

- And above all, the delicate theme of the consistency of actions and decisions between the pillars (inter-pillar) has needed to be confronted (12). This is really the true challenge for the EU: that of presenting itself as a single unit, internationally. This goes both for its image in confrontations with third States, who find it difficult to distinguish between ESDP activities and those of the Commission, as well as for the efficiency of the engagement itself. Recently, a joint Council-Commission planning activity was developed in order to aid coherence between the first and the second pillars. This coordination function was suggested by the Commission itself, in a Communication on “Greater Coherence” (2006). But the most direct contribution to an improved coordination came from the development of two concepts relative to peace missions: the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). These concepts owe their impulse to reflections within the Commission, and to the ESS of Solana, and were established in the CHG 2008. In effect, the policies relative to the two concepts transect the divisions between the Commission and the Council. However, the move to closer relations is difficult, even if in 2006 the EU adopted a Joint Policy Framework for the SSR. In reality the civil makeup of the Commission does not adapt well to that of the ESDP. The integration of activities which fall under the concept of the DDR is faring better. However, in general, many difficulties still remain to be overcome in order to achieve a concrete level of coordination, even if there are positive signals to be seen, such as in the decision, taken in the case of Macedonia, to combine the figures of EU Special Representative with hat of the Head of Delegation of the Commission in Third Countries. Much hope is focused therefore on two developments: the CivMil Cell, specifically created in order combine civil and military aspects, and on new coherence procedures which will need to be tested in future missions.

- Last of all, making the picture even more complex, the new ESDP has created a necessity for a working partnership between national and EU procedures and resources. Within the ESDP, almost all resources at hand are in fact based on national resources which are then used in common for both civil and military missions. It is above all the theme of funding where the difficulties of using the Community budget are noted (13). Firstly, even if in the latest financial perspectives for 2007-13 the budgetary resources for external affairs have

The ESDP and the Fusion Theory

The political-institutional consequences of the development of the ESDP as illustrated above, and of the peace missions, can be categorized, at least in principal, within the Fusion theory line of reasoning. The peace missions have, as seen, caused the creation of new organs and new procedures, expanding the decision-making system of the EU even further, and creating a rather wide spectrum of innovative competencies.

This significant institutional development has, however, also made the already weighty decisional system of the EU even more complex. If on one hand it has allowed a series of concrete problems in the field to be confronted, and has provided practical responses to obstacles which various missions from time to time have had to confront, on the other hand it has increased the confusion regarding the planning patterns for missions, regarding the inter- and intra-pillar coordination, and also the chain of command. The complexity and time-consuming processes of today's institutional apparatus is one of the main reasons why the Europeans have taken the lowest possible level of intensity and risk in EU peace operations. In other words, they have carefully avoided being directly involved in operations of high military and security risk. A recent and significant example of this can be seen in the UNFIL 2 mission in Lebanon (2007), where numerous European States are present (and in full force) but not under the 'flag' of the EU (15).

Finally, we have witnessed a long and controversial process of adaptation (still in progress) of the Member States and their national procedures to the decision making system in the area of ESDP, a

process which conforms to the precepts of fusion theory. Above all, in the area of the military and those related to the funding of missions, the process of a Europeanization of national sovereignty is very slow and subject to many reservations and obstacles. The ESDP remains largely inter-governmental, despite the undoubted practical progresses in function seen during recent years.

Above all, the rapid and unmethodical growth of roles, competencies, organs, and procedures in the area of ESDP has brought about significant political and institutional tensions within the EU. The strategy of institutional growth based on a bottom up process can proceed only up to a certain point, beyond which the risk of paralysis and confusion becomes too high.

The problem of the political/institutional chain of command remains fundamental. A bottom up strategy cannot give a comprehensive framework of rationality and efficiency to decision-making. An institutional top down strategy must also be developed. This has been attempted through various Treaties in the past, but it was the Constitutional Treaty and then the Reform Treaty which made this strategy their particular objective. In the later Treaty, the central figure in the chain of political/institutional command is the High Representative/Minister of Foreign Affairs. This position characterizes the three principal points which are the final elements in the chain of command: the Presidency of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the double competency in foreign affairs as well as defence issues, and the European External Action Service (EEAS), which answers to his/her authority.

But his/her theoretically central position is weakened by the prevalence of inter-governmental aspects within the ESDP. In a comment regarding the figure of the new form of Minister for Foreign Affairs as foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty (2004) Wolfgang Wessels underlined the precariousness of the role: “as a result, supranational and intergovernmental elements are mixed in a complex set of provisions, while the proactive instruments at the Minister’s disposal are rather limited in practice. The constitutional set-up envisaged in the TCE thus places the office-holder in the middle of a vortex of strong inter- and intra-institutional tensions and pressures” (16).

Despite, therefore, a certain rationalisation of the decision-making system of the ESDP, which should come out of the troublesome ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, many other institutional adjustments (once again, the concept of dynamism) are needed in order to balance the inter-governmental aspects with the supranational. Until then, Fusion theory will be applied only partially to a sector of cooperation, the ESDP, that could potentially transform the EU into a global security

institution with innovative and post-modern characteristics, but which might also lead toward a process of fragmentation in absence of a more coherent institutional set up.

Only time will show us whether or not the political and institutional experiences and innovations of recent years will bring us the positive results that fusion theory tends to underline.

The risk is that a mismanaged institutional process could again deliver models of fragmentation and of minimal integration: the role of the institutional figure foreseen by the Reform Treaty, not only that of the High Representative, but also that of an elected President of the European Council and of the Commission will be determinant in the future orientation of the EU towards the ambitious responsibilities required of a new actor in global security.

FOOTNOTES

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http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/reports_10.pdf.
12. on interpillar/intrapillar cooperation see: N.J. Berger and P. Bartholomé, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
13. on the budgetary issue see: R. Gowan, “The EU’s Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security after Lebanon and the Congo”, in *Studia Diplomatica*. Vol. LX, 2007, No. 1, 2007, p. 63; N.J. Berger and P. Bartholomé, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-61; A. Bendiek and H. Whitney-Steele, “The Financing of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Solving the Conundrum”, in *SWP Comments*, No. 16, June 2006.

14. The Athena mechanism (February 2004) is based on national contributions proportional to each country's GNP; the NATO principle says "costs lie where they fall": each country pays for its own military contingent.
15. on Lebanon see: R. Gowan, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-74.
16. W. Wessels, "The Constitutional Treaty-Three Readings from a Fusion Perspective", *op. cit.*, p. 27